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Abstract  
 
Due to the widely observed effectiveness, Inflation Targeting Framework (ITF) has gained 
increasing popularity among monetary policy makers worldwide. This thesis seeks to explore 
the applicability of this policy framework in China based on a thorough study of the inflation 
generating process. When tested against annual data from China, the classic Svensson (1997) 
model does not work well. This might be caused by the assumed absence of supply-side 
factors. An alternative model based on Chand and Singh (2006) is then introduced, allowing 
influences from the supply side, thus loosing this assumption. According to the subsequent 
test, Chinese inflation is primarily a demand-driven process. This makes it potentially 
possible to adopt demand management strategies like Inflation Targeting. But when it comes 
to actual implementation, China still has a long way to go. And among the necessary 
preparations, reforms in the financial sector are truly essential.     
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
In this thesis, the issue of concern is how to manage inflation in China.  
China is now the world’s sixth largest economy, growing at an average rate of 9% or so. 
However, a high degree of fluctuation can be easily detected when looking at the path of 
inflation. Since 1978, the beginning of China’s Opening-up Policy, there has been four 
episodes of inflation already, 1980, 1985, 1988 and 1994-1995, followed by an episode of 
deflation for about 3 years after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. In recent years, however, 
inflation rate seems to be on the rise again. With the importance of inflation stability in mind, 
we are naturally led to the issue of inflation management in China. How to stabilize inflation 
rate over time? What lessons can we learn from the experience of other countries? Should 
government policy be used actively? If so, is monetary policy sufficient in dealing with the 
task? These are questions that lead this research. And the primary purpose is to find a 
practical resolution for the inflation management in China. 
One of the phenomena worth mentioning is the increasing popularity of Inflation 
Targeting Framework (ITF) among monetary policy makers around the world. It has been 
spread over to more than 20 countries in a short history of 15 years. And the combination of 
flexible exchange rate and inflation targeting has become so popular that it is now claimed to 
be the ‘new paradigm for monetary policy’. Among the increasing number of studies 
conducted to test its effectiveness, most have arrived at a positive conclusion. (see Mishkin 
and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001), Berg (2005), Petursson (2004), Vega (2005)). It is indicated that 
on average, inflation has been reduced in countries that adopt an inflation target, and this 
reduction, according to Petursson (2004), is even more pronounced in emerging-markets. 
Inflation targeting also helps in reducing the volatility of inflation in these countries, with no 
significant cost in growth or employment. The apparent success of Inflation Targeting 
Framework leads us to the following question: is ITF also a possible way out for China to 
achieve long term stability of inflation?  
The existing literature on the adoption of ITF in developing, transition and emerging 
economies do not seem to have a consensus. Besides the positive empirical evidence 
mentioned above, there are some other concerns. Masson, Savastano and Sharma (1997) 
argued that the absence of other nominal anchors and the presence of a quantitative 
framework linking policy instruments to inflation are key prerequisites for a country adopting 
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inflation targeting, but they are usually absent among developing countries. Mishkin (2003) 
goes one step further to have five elements listed, presenting their fundamental institutional 
differences from advanced economies that are crucial to sound theoretical models and policy 
advice. These are: 
1. Weak fiscal institutions (…fiscal dominance). 
2. Weak financial institutions including government prudential regulation 
and supervision (…financial dominance). 
3. Low credibility of monetary institutions. 
4. Liability dollarization. 
5. Vulnerability to sudden stops of capital inflows (external dominance). 
 
As one of the few relevant studies of Inflation Targeting in China, Tsang (2002) argued that 
the reforming and constantly changing institutional setup, the uncontrollable price 
components, the regional diversities and the multiple objectives in the formulation of 
development strategy can all cause serious problems for the adoption of ITF.  
However, we should not reject the future prospect of a framework simply because we are 
not yet ready. A sound judgment should be made according to whether it is capable in 
bringing better outcomes to the economy in case of adoption. It is in this spirit that IMF has 
recommended Inflation Targeting Framework for developing countries, despite the apparent 
absence of prerequisites in most cases. It is argued that the commitment to ITF will serve as 
an incentive device to promote necessary reforms in these countries (IMF 2005). It is also in 
this spirit that Chand and Singh (2006) studies the applicability of ITF in India by testing the 
postulated economic structure of standard ITF models. They find an alternative inflation 
generating process that better characterizes the present situation in India, based on which they 
suggest coordinating efforts of monetary, fiscal institutions and supply oriented measures. 
They believe it delivers better inflation outcomes than ITF’s reliance on interest rate 
adjustments does.  
A similar approach is to be adopted in our study of ITF’s applicability in China. Chapter 
2 first gives an overview of the theory of Inflation Targeting, presenting a standard theoretical 
formulation and subsequently testing it with Chinese macroeconomic data. Chapter 3 
introduces an alternative model based on Chand and Singh (2006), allowing more flexibility 
in the policy analysis by combining both demand- and supply-side factors. It is considered a 
more appropriate approach for the discussion of inflation management in relatively less-
developed countries like China. The model is then tested in Chapter 4, and policy implications 
are given accordingly.  
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Chapter 2  Inflation Targeting Theory 
 
The primary purpose of this chapter is to understand inflation targeting from a theoretical 
point of view. A simple review is given in Section 2.1 for some important discoveries in 
macroeconomics that have paved the way for inflation targeting theory. Based on the rationale 
provided by these discoveries, a standard model of inflation targeting is then presented in 
Section 2.2 based on Svensson (1997) with strict inflation targeting in a closed economy. 
Section 2.3 concludes the chapter by summarizing the main assumptions.  
 
2.1 The Rationale for Inflation Targeting 
Inflation Targeting Framework (ITF) is a monetary policy framework first adopted by 
New Zealand in 1990. According to Bernanke et al. (1995): 
 
Inflation targeting is a framework for monetary policy characterized by the 
public announcement of official quantitative targets (or target ranges) for the 
inflation rate over one or more time horizons, and by explicit acknowledgment 
that low, stable inflation is monetary policy’s primary long-run goal. Among 
other important features of inflation targeting are vigorous efforts to 
communicate with the public about the plans and objectives of the monetary 
authorities, and, in many cases, mechanisms that strengthen the central 
bank’s accountability for attaining those objectives. 
 
Generally speaking, the rationale behind ITF follows several trends in macroeconomic 
theory. First, price stability is believed to be the only macroeconomic variable which can be 
affected by monetary policy in the long run. Second, given the unsatisfactory result of 
monetary targeting and the difficulty of maintaining fixed exchange rates, the rate of inflation 
naturally stands out to be the new candidate for nominal anchor. Third, after decades of hot 
debates over “Rules vs. Discretion”, ITF seems to reconcile the conflict with its feature of 
constraint discretion, not only holding in its hand the flexibility of discretion but also the 
credibility of policy rules. We look into each of them hereafter.  
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2.1.1 The Role of Monetary Policy 
Whether or not monetary policy can affect real economy is an issue constantly under 
debate in the history of macroeconomics. Keynesian1, the orthodoxy in the post-war period, 
believes in the existence of a long-term trade-off between inflation and unemployment. They 
argued that a government is capable of steeling the economy away from extreme situations 
and smoothing the business cycle, thus building up grounds for active policy interventions. 
But in the early 1970s, when the active policies carried out by major economies failed to 
alleviate their problems, the loyalty towards Keynesian theory finally reached its end. Since 
then on comes the “Neoclassical-Keynesian Synthesis”, which is the common ground 
between the rivaling Monetarists and New Keynesian economists. 
In the late 1960s, the Monetarist School pioneered by Friedman and Phelps put the 
Keynesian Phillips Curve under attack. They differentiate between long term and short term 
analyses, arguing that the trade-off only exists in short run due to stickiness of price 
adjustments, while in the long run, when prices adjust freely, monetary policy would have no 
effect on real economy and unemployment would eventually return to its natural level. In the 
long run, inflation is considered only a monetary phenomenon. Any expansionary attempts of 
policy makers, as would be suggested by their Keynesian beliefs, would have no decreasing 
effects on the natural rate of unemployment, but they do leave the long run inflation rate 
permanently increased. Therefore, monetary economists believe in rules, by which they can 
anchor public expectations, and always fight against government discretion.  
New Keynesian economists are different from monetarists who mainly focus on 
equilibrium conditions. They believe in the persistence of disequilibrium and are therefore 
more active in policy analyses. But the two schools do share the same analytical framework, 
namely, the short-term vs. long-term dichotomy, the long-term ineffectiveness of monetary 
policy, as well as the short-term trade-off between inflation and unemployment due to the 
presence of sticky prices. Actually, this analytical framework has already become the 
consensus of modern macroeconomics and is also one of the basic beliefs of the inflation 
targeting countries. It leads these monetary authorities to set price stability as their primary 
long-term goal. The goal is assigned higher importance than other goals such as high real 
growth, low unemployment, financial stability and balance of payment. Monetary policy is 
only capable of supporting the other goals, not influencing them directly.  
                                                 
1  Note that the Keynesian here does not refer to the original thoughts from Keynes himself.  
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2.1.2 The Quest for an Effective Nominal Anchor 
According to Leiderman and Svensson (1995), inflation targets have generally been 
introduced either after disappointing experience with monetary targeting, or after being forced 
off fixed exchange rates. Therefore, the rationale behind inflation targeting can also be 
interpreted from a nominal-anchor perspective.  
Given the long-term ineffectiveness of monetary policy, the value of money is the only 
thing for monetary authorities to influence in the long run. Therefore, they should aim at 
stabilizing money value instead of any other real economic variables.  
Under the Gold Standard, every single bill is backed by gold. Government’s ability to 
issue paper currency excessively is therefore strictly restricted, resulting in a fairly stable 
currency value. The era of gold standard actually corresponds to the most stable period in 
human history. Under a fiat money arrangement, on the contrary, the value of money is 
somewhat arbitrarily controlled by the government. Paper money itself has no intrinsic value. 
The value, instead, depends on its expected purchasing power at the time of transaction in the 
future. Accordingly, the objective to stabilize currency value can now be translated into the 
stabilization of expected future purchasing power. And Nowadays, finding an effective 
nominal anchor to peg public expectations is of crucial importance to monetary authorities 
around the world. 
Bretton Woods is a period of fixed exchange rates, with US dollar as the only currency 
backed by gold and all the other currencies maintaining fixed exchange rates against it. US 
dollar is valued at 35 dollar per ounce of gold, which in effect sets the value of this interlinked 
currency network. After the collapse of Bretton Woods, different efforts have been made in 
nominal anchor setting with the hope of fixing exchange rates again, among which there are 
dollarization, currency board and so forth. However, the efforts of fixing exchange rate can 
leave a country extremely vulnerable to speculative attacks. Just think about 1992-1993 in 
Europe, 1994 in Mexico, 1997 in Southeast Asia, 1998 in Brazil and Russia, and 2000-2001 
in Turkey. The lesson has already been taught with enough crises. It is said that for emerging 
market economies, the only sustainable choice for their exchange rate arrangement is either a 
pure float (with absolutely no intervention in the foreign exchange market) or a hard peg (like 
currency board or dollarization). But neither of them can stand out to be a sure winner. A pure 
float may lead to unprecedented fluctuation in real economy and naturally stir up negative 
feelings in our security-seeking minds. A hard peg, however, guards against uncertainty, but 
inevitably hands in its monetary autonomy to the target currency.  Therefore, although some 
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countries still stick to their status quo while constantly pondering over the alternative, an 
increasing number of countries have already abandoned fixed exchange rate in favor of the 
float. 
However, we might miss the point if single-mindedly searching for the proper exchange 
rate setting. The thing is, even if a network of exchange rates has been built up, either fixed or 
constantly adjusted, a specific anchor is still needed to peg the value of this entire ‘network’ 
before it can stabilize public expectations. It is this anchor that we are searching for, the 
thread connecting us with the kite, rather than the way that different parts of the kite get 
connected. A hard peg, say, dollarization, is simply a free-rider mechanism for the small 
economies. Just as the European countries adopting a single currency still need monetary 
policies of European Central Bank to stabilize price level in the long run, dollarization only 
exports the inflation management task from a small country to the United States, while the 
United States still have to face the problem up right. Therefore, to fix the exchange rate alone 
cannot be an effective nominal anchor. The Inflation Targeting approach, by targeting future 
inflation rate and letting exchange rate purely float, gets hold of “the thread attached to the 
kite” and is finally capable of affecting public expectations of the currency value. Therefore, 
it is more likely to be the right candidate for an effective nominal anchor.    
 
2.1.3 The Rules vs. Discretion Debate  
One of the essential features of inflation targeting theory is its emphasis on credibility 
and transparency. That’s mainly the result of the rules-vs.-discretion debate.  
Kydland (1977) first pointed out the dynamic inconsistency problem involved in optimal 
policy analyses. Expectations of future policy are considered to affect people’s current 
decisions. Therefore, when an optimal policy is carried out and people’s decisions affected, 
the optimal used-to-be is no longer optimal. Given this, policy formulations under discretion 
might turn out to have counter-stabilizing effects on the economy. Instead, adopting policy 
rules can help coordinate between policy objectives and people’s expectations, thus achieving 
better results. Friedman’s simple rule of maintaining a constant money growth is a classic 
example. Later, we have McCallum (1988) Rule, proposing a reaction-function rule for the 
growth rate of money supply with respect to the deviation of nominal output growth from its 
target; we have Taylor (1993) Rule, proposing an interest rate rule as a function of inflation 
gap and output gap; and we also have Orphanides (1999) Rule, another interest rate rule as a 
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reaction function of inflation rate, nominal output and equilibrium interest rate. However, it is 
rather difficult to judge which one of them has the virtue to stand out.  
It was Barro (1983) who raised the credibility issue within the field of monetary policy, 
questioning central bank’s doubtful gesture of pursuing low inflation.  Because the Phillips 
Curve trade-off does exist in the short-run, it is obviously optimal for a discretionary authority 
to inflate the economy and trade it for lower unemployment and higher income. And when 
people adapt their beliefs, raising their inflation expectations, the real effect of the monetary 
expansion will vanish, leaving merely an Inflation Bias, which is unfortunately a permanent 
increase. Different proposals were made afterwards to solve the inflation bias problem. 
Rogoff (1985) suggests delegating monetary policy to an independent central banker with a 
reputation of strong dislike towards inflation. And others suggest signing an inflation contract 
between the government and the central bank, just like what the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand has done, linking the income of the central banker with the outcome of inflation 
management to provide sufficient disincentives for monetary myopia. The inflation targeting 
literature, too, is one of the efforts fighting against inflation bias. By publicly committing to a 
quantitative inflation target and cherishing reputation and credibility, it poses a long term 
constraint on the central bank’s decision problem and at the same time allows discretion in the 
short run. It is claimed that inflation targeting framework links policy to medium- and long-
term horizon without crippling the central bank’s ability to respond to short-run developments, 
and it creates a rough compromise between the discipline and accountability of rigid rules and 
the flexibility of the discretionary approach (Bernanke 1999).  
The combination of inflation targeting and a flexible exchange rate has become the new 
paradigm for monetary policy. But among the inflation targeting literature, there are different 
ideas concerning what is the proper type of policy rule it should adopt, instrument rule or 
targeting rule (Svensson 2002).2 But this is clearly beyond the scope of this thesis. We’ll not 
explore this topic any further.   
 
                                                 
2 Instrument rule refers to the practice of committing to the reaction function derived from central bank’s optimization 
problem. Targeting rule refers to the practice of committing to the first order condition itself, rather than the result. Targeting 
rule is considered more flexible. (see Svensson 2002) 
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2.2 ITF as Central Bank’s Decision Problem 
After enough background information, we now turn to the theory of inflation targeting 
itself. Inflation targeting is a framework for deriving optimal monetary policy under a long 
term constraint. The most important component is that central bank publicly commits to a 
specific numerical target and promises to achieve it in the long run. Central bank, a dynamic 
optimizer, then tries to choose the best future path for its instrument given a postulated 
dynamic structural model economy, aiming at achieving its policy objectives.  
In mathematical terms, a dynamic optimization problem normally consists of an objective 
function, spelling out the criteria for optimality; control variables, over which we have control 
and by which we could influence the future path of the system; state variables, describing the 
status of the system, and the law of motions, describing the dynamic mechanism governing its 
development. Svensson gives a clear theoretical formulation of the inflation targeting problem 
(Svensson 1997).  And we will use this classic and simple model to explain the fundamentals.  
 
2.2.1 Loss Function 
The rationale behind stabilization policy is that fluctuation can do damage to social 
welfare. Central bank generally cares about social benefit, or, wants to minimize social loss. 
And the loss function is the objective function in this dynamic optimization problem. Central 
bank wants to stabilize inflation, and more specifically, it wants to maintain stability over a 
long period of time.  
In Svensson (1997) model, the instantaneous loss function has the following form  
* 2
t t
1L( ) ( )
2
π π π= −         2.1 
where 
*π  is the inflation target and tπ  is the inflation rate of period t.  Svensson (1997) model 
was then sorted as ‘strict inflation targeting’, as oppose to ‘flexible inflation targeting’, where 
the objective function also includes output stabilizing considerations: 
* 2 2
t t t t
1L( , y ) [( ) y ]
2
π π π λ= − +       2.2 
Here, ty  is the output gap in period t.  λ  reflects the weight that is put on real considerations 
in the decision process. Clearly, the latter is a more general formulation. When λ=0 , flexible 
inflation targeting will be reduced to exactly the same as strict inflation targeting. But, we’ll 
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stick to the strict version to proceed, because it is enough to reflect the basic decision process 
involved and it can simplify the calculation a lot. 3  
Based on the strict version of instantaneous loss function, we have the inter-temporal loss 
function as follows, where central bank minimizes the expected present value of all future 
loss from inflation fluctuations: 
-t -t * 2
t t t
=t =t
1E L( ) E ( )
2
τ τ
τ
τ τ
δ π δ π π∞ ∞= −∑ ∑ , 0 1δ< <  ( δ  is the discount factor).  2.3 
 
2.2.2 Policy Instrument 
The choice of policy instrument is actually the choice of control variable. There used to 
be a hot debate over this issue. One of the classics would be Poole (1970), where he argues 
whether to choose monetary stock or interest rate as policy instrument should be determined 
according to specific institutional parameters of the economy in question, or, the relative 
disturbances that the economy is facing. However, with financial innovations, money stock 
seems to be increasingly getting out of control, which obviously ruins its candidacy of policy 
instrument. Therefore, in Svensson’s model, as well as most of the contemporary monetary 
policy literature, the instrument of monetary policy is set default to be nominal short-term 
interest rate. 
  
2.2.3 Transmission Mechanism and Economic Structure 
Svensson (1997) gives the following transmission mechanism for monetary policy: 
t+1 t 1 t t 1xπ π α ε += + +         2.4 
t 1 1 t 2 t t 1x x rβ β η+ += − +         2.5 
t t t t+1 t t t+1r (1 i ) /(1 E ) 1 i Eπ π≡ + + − −       2.6 
( 1 1 2α ,β ,β 0> ,  1<1β )  
t+1 t+1ε ,η  are shocks to aggregate supply and aggregate demand. Both are assumed to be i.i.d. 
and cannot be known before period t+1. tπ  is the inflation rate of period t; tx  is the output 
                                                 
3 Svensson (1997) models strict inflation targeting under closed economy, which is the most basic model setup. For more 
complicated models of inflation targeting, one can consult  Svensson (2003) and Agenor (2000).  
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gap; ti  is the nominal interest rate; and tr  is real interest rate. t t+1E π  is the expected inflation 
rate of period t+1 based on the information available at time t.  
By substituting, we arrive at the following law of motions 
t+2 1 t+1 1 2 1 t 1 2 t t 2 1 t 1 1 t 1(1 ) ( ) i ( )π β π α β β π α β ε β ε α η+ + += + + − − + − +         2.7 
  
In equation 2.4, inflation rate is a function of previous inflation, previous output gap and 
current supply shocks. In equation 2.5, output gap is determined by previous output gap, 
previous real interest rate and demand shocks. The model assumes a one-year lag between 
inflation and output gap, and a one-year lag for interest rate to affect aggregate demand. The 
fact 1 1β <  corresponds to the long run monetary ineffectiveness, because the immediate 
effects of interest rate adjustments will gradually die out as time passes by.  However, the 
coefficient of lagged inflation rate is 1, meaning that the effect on inflation will be permanent. 
Therefore, monetary expansion will lead to an inflation bias as suggested by Barro and 
Gordon (1983).  
 
2.2.4 The Central Bank’s Problem 
The central bank’s problem can be presented as follows: 
t
-t
t{i } =t
min  E L( )τ τ
τ
δ π∞∑  
s.t. t+2 1 t+1 1 2 1 t 1 2 t t 2 1 t 1 1 t 1(1 ) ( ) i ( ), tπ β π α β β π α β ε β ε α η+ + += + + − − + − + ∀  
where * 2t t
1L( ) ( )
2
π π π= −  
Central bank is trying to solve for an optimal path for its interest rate setting, such that 
along this path the expected future welfare loss is minimized. From equation 2.7, we find that 
the interest rate of period t can only affect the inflation rate in two periods, that of period t+2. 
It means that the infinite horizon problem above is actually separable and can be reformulated 
into the repetition of the following:  
t
2 -t
t t+2 ti [ t, ), 2
min  E L( ) E L( )τ τ
τ τ
δ π δ π
∈ ∞ ≠
+ ∑  
s.t. t+2 1 t+1 1 2 1 t 1 2 t t 2 1 t 1 1 t 1(1 ) ( ) i ( )π β π α β β π α β ε β ε α η+ + += + + − − + − +  
Note that the latter half of the objective function is irrelevant to current choice, which 
enables us to ignore it when taking derivatives. The first order condition is therefore 
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2
2 *t t 2
1 2 t t+2
t
E L( ) (E ) 0
i
δ π δ α β π π+∂ = − − =∂
*
t t+2E π π⇒ =    2.8 
 *1 2 t t+1 1 1 t 1 2 t(1 )E x iα β π α β α β π⇒ + + − =      2.9 
 given t t+2 t t+1 1 t t+1 1 2 t t+1 1 1 t 1 2 tE E E x (1 )E x iπ π α α β π α β α β= + = + + −   2.10 
 
Central bank’s optimal choice of period t interest rate is the one that would make the 
expected inflation rate in period t+2 hit the target. And the first order condition is equivalent 
to equation 2.9, given the expression in 2.10 which is obtained from 2.7. Rearranging 2.9 
leads us to the following interest rate rule: 
* 1
t t t+1 1 t t+1 2 t 1 2
1 2 2
1i E a (E ) a x ,a ,a βπ π π α β β= + − + = =     2.11 
It says that interest rate setting should respond to current output gap, the expected 
inflation next period and its deviation from the long run target. In steady state, when real 
output equals potential output and inflation rate hits the target ( *x=0,π=π ), the welfare loss 
from inflation fluctuation would be zero, and the real interest rate zero too, because nominal 
interest rate would be set numerically equal to the inflation target. 
The above instrument rule looks familiar, with the apparent similarity to Taylor rule, but 
the two of them are genuinely different. Taylor rule belongs to the simple-instrument-rule 
category, where the coefficients of the reaction function are obtained statistically from 
historical practice, while those of the above rule are derived optimally from a structural model, 
which digs deeper into the way that economy works. Therefore, the accuracy of the model in 
use is kind of a crucial element in the formulation of this type of rules. However, no matter 
how accurate a model could be, it is no more than a theoretical simplification of the complex 
world. Shocks to the economy occur from time to time, under some circumstances even 
changing the whole picture. In light of this, Svensson further differentiates targeting rules 
from optimal instrument rules. With targeting rules, central banks commit themselves directly 
to the first order condition rather than the result derived from it, which allows necessary 
adjustments to the model in response to possible structural breaks. Targeting rule also requires 
transparency, which enables it to incorporate more discretionary flexibility into the decision 
process without any dampening of its credibility. (Svensson 2003).  
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2.2.5 Summary of Inflation Targeting Theory 
 Now, we are ready to summarize the key features of inflation targeting theory: 
 First, the goal(s) of monetary policy is(are) specified in the objective function. In the 
context of strict inflation targeting, central bank only cares about the stability of inflation, 
minimizing the welfare loss induced by its fluctuations around the target in all future periods. 
Under flexible inflation targeting, central bank also care about fluctuations of real economic 
variables such as output gap, assigning different weights to multiple objectives in the decision 
process. Generally speaking, the heavier the weight put on real considerations, the more 
gradual the adjustment will be to make the inflation back to target in response to a shock. 
Second, the first order condition of this optimization problem is to have expected future 
inflation rate equal to the committed long term target. Expected inflation is the intermediate 
target of monetary policy in this case, and to realize the committed inflation target is the sole 
responsibility of central bank under this monetary policy framework.  
Third, the economy should be dynamic and policy instrument normally takes some time 
to cast its influence on the target variable. That is to say, monetary policy makers need to act 
today in order to influence the economic variable tomorrow. Expectation also takes an 
important part in this process, which brings about the concerns over time inconsistency in 
macroeconomic policies and the whole issue of independence, transparency and credibility in 
central bank’s decision process.  
Fourth, inflation dynamics is assumed to be demand driven in standard inflation targeting 
models, where monetary policies are demand shocks that affect inflation permanently and real 
variables temporarily. However, supply shocks do occur in real world, which are literarily 
beyond the scope of the demand management. A concept of core inflation is therefore 
introduced, excluding the highly fluctuating cost factors in the price index, as the price index 
that monetary policy makers should focus on.  
Finally, we need to say something about the choice of policy instrument as short term 
nominal interest rate, which the standard inflation targeting theory always takes for granted. 
Consider the other traditionally accepted instruments, such as money stock and exchange rate. 
Due to the widely observed endogeneity of money demand and the vulnerability of fixed 
exchange rate uncovered by successive financial crises, those instruments are no longer 
appropriate in the minds of most macroeconomists around the world. However, there might 
be significant deviation from this assumption when analyzing relatively underdeveloped 
economies and the countries where interest rates are not yet ready to act as policy instruments.  
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2.3 Test of Svensson(1997) Model’s Specification 4 
We now set out to test the Svensson (1997) Model, the most classic model of inflation 
targeting we’ve presented in the previous section. By testing the model, we mean to test its 
reduced form, where the endogenous future inflation is expressed only in terms of pre-
determined and exogenous variables. From equation 2.4-2.6, we get the following reduced 
form, where the explanatory variables are output gap, inflation and interest rate. 
t+2 1 t+1 1 2 1 t 1 2 t t 2 1 t 1 1 t 1
1 2 t 1 1 t 1 2 t t 2 t 1 1 t 1
(1 ) ( ) i ( )
(1 ) (1 )x i ( )
π β π α β β π α β ε β ε α η
α β π α β α β ε ε α η
+ + +
+ + +
= + + − − + − +
= + + + − + + +  
 
2.3.1 Data 
To test the above reduced form, we need time series data of annual inflation (Pi), annual 
output gap (GAP) and interest rates (I_len for lending rate and I_dep for deposit rate). It is 
apparently better to use quarterly data under this context, but the report of quarterly data 
started unfortunately only in recent years. Conducting the research on a yearly basis is 
therefore the only option left to have sufficient number of observations involved for the 
validity of statistical inferences.  
Inflation and its lag structure 
Inflation rate is a flow variable which measures the rate of increase of the general price 
level over a certain period of time. Price level, on the contrary, is a stock variable measured in 
a specific point in time. Different ways are employed to reflect different focuses in price 
measurement. The price indices we can get from National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) in 
P.R.China include Consumer Price Index (CPI) since 1985, Retail Price Index (RPI) since 
1978, Ex-factory Price Indices of Industrial Products (arguably Producer Price Index as in 
developed countries) since 1985, Purchasing Price Indices of Raw Material, Fuel and Power 
since 1989 and Investment in Fixed Assets Price Index since 1991. The choice of index to be 
used in our analysis is more than a simple pickup. It is a tradeoff. On one hand, we need to 
find a price level that is sufficiently general; on the other hand, we need to be aware of the 
                                                 
4 The analysis is conducted using PcGive 10. PcGive is an interactive menu-driven program for econometric modeling and 
version 10 is the latest version. It uses Give Win for data input and graphical and text output. One can consult Hendry and 
Doornik (2001) for details of the program. 
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fact that for developing countries, data quality is always poor, and where there are data, there 
are always not as many as we need. There’s no ready solution to this. All we could probably 
do is to face the fact and get the best result out of the blue.  
Consumer Price Index (CPI), the weighted average price of a specific consumption 
basket consisting of representative goods and services, is the most common index employed 
in inflation analysis. Inflation rate can be defined as the rate of growth of CPI. GDP deflator 
is another popular measure of inflation rate, which is usually calculated by the researcher 
from the nominal and real GDP that are published. It is probably the most general index, 
because it taks into account price changes in all newly domestically produced final goods and 
services in an economy. And it is based on a constantly changing basket, rather than the fixed 
basket of CPI, and it apparently allows for evolution of consumption pattern over time. But 
there’s one vital fact about GDP deflator that makes it inappropriate for our analysis. It is an 
implicit index which can only be obtained after a significant lag by calculations based on 
published data, but the central bank should always act well ahead of time. Since it is only 
slightly more accurate than CPI inflation, we’d rather make use of the latter. 
 
Figure 2-1 Inflation Measured by Percentage Change of CPI and RPI 
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(Output from PcGive 10.0) 
 
However, using CPI for China still has a minor problem. Recall that the NBS started its 
CPI reporting from 1985, we even won’t have a sufficient length when using annual data. To 
solve this problem, we compare CPI inflation with RPI inflation and find that it is appropriate 
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to assume RPI as a perfect substitute for CPI before 1985. The difference between RPI and 
CPI is that the latter also includes service sector prices, while the former only reflects the 
price of retail goods. As shown in Figure 2-1, the two inflation series largely overlap with 
each other before 1990, suggesting substitutability between them for the corresponding period. 
Relevant studies also confirm that at the initial periods, after China’s adoption of its opening 
up policy in 1978, service sector is so underdeveloped that RPI and CPI can substitute each 
other without significant impact on analytical result. (Jiang, 1997) Therefore, we’ll construct 
a CPI inflation series, assuming RPI is a perfect substitute for CPI before 1985, when the CPI 
is not yet officially published. 
The above price level index is reported with constant price on a year-to-year basis. That 
is to say, each price level index is presented in percentage point with respect to the price level 
of the previous year. In order to make it comparable, we need to convert it to a base-year 
index. Based on constant price of 1977, the base year series can be calculated from the 
original series by cumulative multiplication of all preceding year-to-year indices. Then, we 
can get the series of inflation by differencing its log5 and denote it with Pi.  
 
Table 1 Unit Root Test of Inflation, Output Gap and Interest Rate 
Variable 
(X) 
Model ADF Test Ho: β2=1 H1: β2≠1 Conclusion 
Pi -2.933(-2.991) Fail to reject Non-stationary 
Dpi -4.503**(-2.977) Reject Stationary 
GAP -4.631**(-2.985) Reject Stationary 
I(deposit) -1.293(-2.997) Fail to reject Non-stationary 
I(lending) 
X=β1+β2X(-1)+β3∆X(-1)+ε 
-1.856(-2.997) Fail to reject Non-stationary 
Note: Values in parentheses are critical values used in corresponding ADF tests at 5% significance level. 
 
To prevent spurious regression in time series analysis, we need to judge whether the 
variables are stationary. Table 1 summarizes the results from Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
test for all the relevant variables in our analysis. We can see that the null hypothesis of the 
existence of a unit root, meaning non-stationary, failed to be rejected for Pi, while it is 
successfully rejected for its first difference Dpi. One might immediately arrive at a conclusion 
                                                 
5 The first difference of its log is approximately the rate of growth. 
1 1
1
1 1 1
ln ln ln ln(1 )t t t t tt t
t t t
p p p p pp p
p p p
− −
−
− − −
− −− = = + ≈  
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that Pi is integrated of order one, or I(1). However, statistically speaking, not reject does not 
necessarily imply acceptance. Figure 2-2 plots the Autocorrelation Function (ACF) and 
Partial Autocorrelation Function (PACF) of Pi, where we could find the coefficients of ACF 
and PACF both dying out pretty quickly. This is the sign of a stationary process. Since it is 
now well known that the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests have low power, we fit Pi by an 
ADL model instead to test its stationarity and lag structure. By choosing the lowest reported 
information criterion (see Table 2) among different regression models 6 , an ARMA(1,1) 
specification is finally determined and the regression result is presented in Table 3. 
  
Figure 2-2  Inflation Rate: ACF and PACF 
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(Output from PcGive 10.0) 
 
 
                                                 
6 In time series analyses, it is always not easy to decide the proper model specification. Information Criterion is always used 
to help us choose the best model. Commonly used information criteria include AIC (Akaike Information Criterion), HQ 
(Hannan-Quinn Criterion) and SC (Schwarz Criterion). However, different criterion might lead to different results. Generally 
speaking, for cases where sample size is larger than 16, we have  
ˆ ˆ ˆp(SC) p(HQ) p(AIC)≤ ≤  
That is, AIC normally selects the most lags among the three criteria, while SC chooses the fewest.  
 
17 
————————————————————————————————————— 
 
Table 2 Model Selection Based on Information Criteria 
 Log-likelihood SC HQ AIC 
AR(1) 43.151047 -3.0687 -3.1376 -3.1655
AR(2) 45.695427 -3.1391 -3.2425 -3.2843
AR(3) 46.170720 -3.0506 -3.1882 -3.2439
MA(1) 46.288481 -3.3100 -3.3789 -3.4068
MA(2) 47.651056 -3.2895 -3.3929 -3.4347
ARMA(1,1) 47.759843 -3.2979 -3.4013 -3.4431
ARMA(2,1) 47.768575 -3.1733 -3.3111 -3.3668
ARMA(2,2) 48.542347 -3.1075 -3.2797 -3.3494
(Output from PcGive 10.0) 
 
The evidence for persistence of inflation is not strong since the coefficient for lagged 
inflation is only significant at 10 per cent level. However, the moving average term is highly 
significant, suggesting positive autocorrelation. But the fact that it is less than one suggests 
the absence of permanent influence from those shocks.   
 
 
Table 3 Maximun Likelihood Estimation of ARFIMA(1,0,1), Period 1979-2004 
Regression function:   ** ***
(0.020) (0.196)
0.054 0.362 ( 1)Pi Pi= + −  
Moving average term:   *1(0.131)0.845t t tu ε ε −= +  
 
Log-likelihood 47.7598425, Mean(Pi)=0.0576356, var(Pi)=0.0037922, sigma=0.0371447, sigma^2=0.00137973 
* significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 10% level 
Values in parenthesis ( ) are standard errors and values in square brackets [ ] are p-values. 
 
 
 
Output gap 
Our data on output include nominal GDP (valued at current price) from 1978-2004 
(denoted as NY), and real GDP (index number with preceding year as 100) from 1978-2004. 
Just as what we’ve done with CPI, the above real GDP is converted to a base year series with 
1977 constant price. We name it RY for real output. Output gap is then defined following the 
trend of modern business cycle analysis as the gap between log(RY) and its smoothed trend, 
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which is obtained by Hodrick-Prescott Filter7 and taken to be the potential level of real output. 
Since data are annual, the proper smoothing parameter should be λ =1600/44=6.25, the fourth 
power of the change in observation frequency for data observed at a frequency different from 
quarterly. (see Lutkepohl, 2004; Ravn and Uhlig, 2001) And the derived series of output gap 
is then named GAP. Unit root test shows that GAP is stationary (see Table 1).  
 
Figure 2-3 Interest rates: Deposit Rate vs. Lending Rate 
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(Output from PcGive) 
                                                 
7 Hodrick-Prescott Filter (HP Filter) is a popular tool used in business cycle analysis. It normally applies to a Trend 
Stationary Process (TSP) rather than a Difference Stationary Process (DSP). Denote the series by y1, y2,…, yT, then HP filters 
specifies the trend of the series to be the component that solves the following minimization problem: 
{ }T 2 2t 1 1
t=1t
min (y ) [( ) ( )]t t t t tμ μ λ μ μ μ μ+ −− + − − −∑  
where the parameter λ defines the smoothness of the filtered series (the trend).   
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Interest rate 
There are data for two interest rates available, annual lending rate and annual deposit 
rate.8  
Figure 2-3 plots the Autocorrelation Function (ACF) and Partial Autocorrelation 
Function (PACF) of the two interest rates and their first differences. All coefficients of the 
differenced series lie between the lines of significance, while the coefficients of the original 
series die out pretty quickly. Hence, the underlying autocorrelation functions and partial 
autocorrelation functions may be in line with transformed stationary processes. The ADF tests 
in Table 1 also fail to reject the null hypothesis of unit root for these two series. They can be 
regarded as I(1).  
 
2.3.2 Test of Svensson’s Model 
Now that we have data ready, we set out to test the reduced form of Svensson’s structural 
model. Though non-stationary, interest rate is still kept in the regression model as required by 
theory. Residuals are subsequently tested for unit root in order to make sure that the 
regression results are actually consistent.  
Regression results are presented in detail in Table 4. To put if briefly, the model to be 
tested is    
t+2 1 2 t 1 1 t 1 2 t t 2 t 1 1 t 1(1 ) (1 )x i ( )π α β π α β α β ε ε α η+ + += + + + − + + + ,where 1 1 2, , 0α β β >   
And we have the following results: 
 
[A-1]                   
***
t t-2 t-2 t 2(0.052) (0.644) (0.013) (1.046)
0.054-0.746 0.024i 0.317 xπ π −= − + +  
R2=0.2453  F(3,18)=1.95[0.158]  DW=0.915 
 
[A-2]              t t-2 t-2 t 2(0.082) (0.482) (0.013) (0.966)
0.008 0.232 0.005i 0.797 xπ π −= + + −  
R2=0.1002  F(3,18)=0.668[0.583]  DW=0.812 
 
[A-3]   
*** ***
t t 1 t-2 t-1 t-2 t 1 t 2(0.036) (0.403) (0.427) (0.010) (0.009) (0.719 0.791
-0.044 0.165 0.436 0.018i 0.001i 1.423x 1.184xπ π π− − −= + − + + + −） （ ）  
                                                 
8 In this chapter, we test the model with explanatory variables suggested by Svensson’s original expression. But in fact, 
interest rate may not be an effective policy instrument in China. We’ll look into this issue in later chapters.  
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  R2=0.7799  F(6,15)=8.859[0.000]*  DW=1.78 
[A-4]  
*** **
t t 1 t-2 t-1 t-2 t 1 t 2(0.082) (0.382) (0.453) (0.016) (0.010) (0.829 0.904
0.034 0.808 0.010 0.002i 0.001i 1.117 x 1.947 xπ π π− − −= + + − − + −） （ ）  
  R2=0.7156  F(6,15)=6.291[0.002]*  DW=1.72 
 
 
Table 4 Regression Results with Svensson’s Lag Structure 
  A-1 A-2 A-3 A-4 
 Pi Pi Pi Pi 
  (1982-2003/04) (1982-2003/04) (1982-2003/04) (1982-2003/04) 
Constant -0.054(0.052) 0.008(0.082) -0.044(0.036) 0.034(0.082) 
Pi_1   0.165(0.403) 0.808(0.382)*** 
Pi_2 -0.746(0.644) 0.232(0.482) -0.436(0.427)*** 0.010(0.453) 
I_dep_1   0.018(0.010)  
I_dep_2 0.024(0.013)***  0.001(0.009)  
I_lend_1    -0.002(0.016) 
I_lend_2  0.005(0.013)  -0.001(0.010) 
GAP_1   1.423(0.719)*** 1.117(0.829) 
GAP_2 0.317(1.046) -0.797(0.966) -1.184(0.791) -1.947(0.904)** 
     
Sigma 0.0632 0.0690101  0.0373868 0.0424992 
RSS 0.0718962997 0.0857230463 0.0209666297 0.0270927776 
R^2 0.245319 0.100183 0.779918 0.715613 
F(k-1,n-k) 1.95 [0.158] 0.668 [0.583] 8.859 [0.000]* 6.291 [0.002]* 
log-likelihood 31.7427 29.8078 45.2979 42.4782 
DW 0.915 0.812 1.78 1.72 
N 22 22 22 22 
K 4 4  7 7 
mean(Pi) 0.061749 0.061749 0.061749 0.06174 
var(Pi) 0.00433033 0.00433033 0.00433033 0.00433033 
     
ForecastCHSQ 0.42237 [0.5158] 0.00014458 [0.9904] 0.59651 [0.4399] 0.027311 [0.8687] 
AR 1-2 test 10.443 [0.0013]* 14.862 [0.0002]*  1.0389 [0.3814]  0.86642 [0.4434]  
ARCH 1-1 test 0.064777 [0.8023] 0.38849 [0.5419]  0.11201 [0.7432] 0.0015696 [0.9690] 
Normality test 2.0905 [0.3516] 9.6085 [0.0082]* 0.87106 [0.6469]  11.417 [0.0033]* 
Hetero test 1.1610 [0.3918] 2.0360 [0.1454] 0.15013 [0.9887]  0.27215 [0.9431] 
RESET test 0.072768 [0.7906]   1.6357 [0.2181]  5.4000 [0.0357]** 0.91199 [0.3558] 
          
Note: Predictive failure tests are conducted by breaking the sample at 2004. * significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% 
level, *** significant at 10% level. Values in parenthesis () are standard errors and values in square brackets [ ] are p-values. 
 
 
Regression function [A-1] uses deposit rate, while [A-2] uses lending rate. Both of them 
have a lag structure that is exactly the same as that of the reduced form above. We are 
interested in checking the sign and significance of lagged output gap and lagged interest rate. 
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The passing of normality test assures us of the validity of t- and F-tests. It is clear that the 
coefficients are not significant (t-statistics not significant), nor are the models as a whole (F-
statistics not significant). We then include the full set of lags to get model A-3 and A-4, with 
deposit rate being used in the former case and lending rate in the latter.   
The notable improvements in R-square suggest increased explanatory power with the 
inclusion of first lags. The F-tests also turn out to be significant. However, the regression 
results are not satisfactory in the sense that the sign and significance of certain coefficients are 
not what we’ve expected. An increase in deposit rate would encourage household to save 
more and spend less, while an increase in lending rate would dampen investment demand, 
both of which contribute negatively to the rate of inflation. Therefore, we are expecting 
negative signs for interest rates. However, coefficients of deposit rate in Model A-3 are 
positive and not significantly different from zero. The two-period-lagged inflation and the 
one-period-lagged output gap are significant, but only at 10% level. Coefficients of interest 
rate are negative in Model A-4, but they are not significant either. One-period-lagged inflation 
and two-period-lagged output gap are explanatory variables that are significant, at 10% and 
5% level respectively.  
 
2.3.3 China-specific Factors 
Given the above results, Svensson (1997) model doesn’t seem to provide sufficient 
explanatory power to the inflation dynamics in China. Several possible China specific factors 
might have contributed to this result. 
Historical events 
Figure 2-4 plots inflation rate and output gap for the period from 1978 to 2004. The 
correlation between inflation and output gap no longer seems to be obvious after 1995, which 
indicates the existence of influences from factors other than aggregate demand. In order to 
find explanations for this phenomenon, we turn to the historical development of the 
corresponding period. China used to be a central-planning economy, with all the prices 
determined by the government. During the late 1970s and the beginning of 1980s, China 
gradually freed the prices and let them determined by market forces. The reform was finally 
completed at around 1994, when all the hidden inflationary pressure finally floated above the 
surface. It contributes to the severe inflation surge right afterwards, with the rate of inflation 
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rising up to a level as high as 24%. Another influential event would be the Southeast Asia 
Financial Crisis in 1997. China was then driven into a persistent deflationary period for about 
2 years.  
 
Figure 2-4 Inflation and Output Gap 
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
Pi GAP 
 
(Output from PcGive) 
Target and instrument 
In standard inflation targeting framework, monetary authority should have no target other 
than inflation rate, neither exchange rate nor money growth; and the short term nominal 
interest rate should be a feasible instrument for the conduct of monetary policy. However, 
these assumptions may not apply within the Chinese context. 
According to Leiderman and Svensson (1995), inflation targets normally play two roles:  
 
First, as an anchor or coordination device for those involved in the price and 
wage setting process and in financial markets; and second, as a transparent 
guide to the national monetary and fiscal authorities’ policy actions, 
clarifying their commitment to and accountability for the achievement of price 
stability.  
 
Only with the absence of other targets can the commitment to low inflation be credible. 
However, China has more than enough reasons to be cautious in the setting of policy 
objectives. Neglecting certain objectives could entail tremendous loss to the society. Studies 
show that the introduction of inflation targeting framework can bring extra fluctuation in 
nominal interest rate and nominal exchange rate. If interest rate is assigned to the control of 
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domestic inflation, the exchange rate must be left freely floating. However, the Chinese 
currency, RMB, has been literarily pegged to US dollar since the middle of 1990s and is 
believed to be highly undervalued at this moment. The expectation of appreciation has already 
given rise to the large volume of speculative capital inflows, leaving the country fairly 
vulnerable for large exchange rate fluctuations. What’s more, the foreign exchange reserves 
of China, currently the largest around the world, are mostly dollar-denominated assets. If at 
this point we let the exchange rate float and RMB appreciates against US dollar as expected, 
the resulting loss of wealth would be enormous. Therefore, although the large trade surplus 
has put RMB under high pressure to appreciate, the Chinese government is still quite reluctant 
to make the change. In July 2005, China carried out a reform of the exchange rate, only 
announcing a gradual approach towards the floating arrangement. RMB is now pegged to a 
basket of major currencies with a somewhat secret recipe of its composition. And the nominal 
exchange rate is allowed to fluctuate within a ceiling and a floor per day. Since then, RMB 
has being appreciating gradually for about 3.5%, easing out the pressures from EU and US 
concerning the trade surplus, while at the same time allowing sufficient time for necessary 
internal adjustments. No matter how, given the current situation, China is obviously not ready 
to float the exchange rate, and the consideration of exchange rate stability is and will still 
remain on top of the list for any macroeconomic policy formulations. 
Svensson’s assumption of an effective interest rate instrument may also be violated in the 
Chinese case. China is not like the advanced economies, where the adjustments of short term 
interest rate are spread to long term rates through term structure on the money market. In 
China, as in most developing countries, there is a certain degree of financial repression 
inherited. Deposit rates and savings rates used to be controlled by the authority and kept lower 
than market level to boost economic growth. Interest rates are not determined on money 
market and can’t be trusted in guiding the allocation of investment. However, interest rate 
liberalization has been gradually taking place in China, from foreign currency to domestic 
currency, from loans to deposits, form rural areas to cities, from long term to short term, 
transforming towards the direction of market mechanism. And People’s Bank of China 
(PBoC), the central bank, did successfully curb inflation in late 1980s and at the middle of 
1990s by raising interest rate. However, during the deflationary era after 1997, although 
PBoC cut the interest rate several times, the economy simply didn’t respond and thus failed to 
be inflated. Fiscal policy took on the role afterwards. Therefore, in addition to the installation 
of the appropriate market structure, a market-oriented culture and corresponding institutional 
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environment are also crucial for the effectiveness of the interest rate instrument. And China 
still has a long way to go. 
 
Demand and supply factors 
In standard inflation targeting theory, the inflation generating process is assumed to be a 
demand-driven process. Supply shocks are assumed to be white noises while monetary and 
fiscal policy shocks determine the inflation dynamics through the so-called “aggregate 
demand channel”. This assumption might not hold in reality. And the recent forecast failures 
in several western inflation targeting countries undoubtedly serve as good examples. The fact 
that model-based inflation forecasts always turned out to be higher than the realized levels 
might be caused by their ignorance of the “China Effect”, the downward influence on general 
price level due to the large amount of cheap imports from China. Besides this, factors such as 
wage increase, surging oil prices and technological improvements are also common supply 
side factors that should be treated fairly. It is believed that supply side factors may have even 
larger impacts on developing countries. In light of this, Chand and Singh (2006) propose a 
broad-based structural model, including both supply and demand factors, from which they 
detect the supply-driven feature of the Indian inflation process. However, the existing 
literature on the nature of Chinese inflation dynamics are still quite limited and the 
conclusions mixed. Scheibe and Vines (2005), fitting data to a partially forward-looking 
hybrid Phillips Curve, shows that output gap, exchange rate and inflation expectations play an 
important role in explaining inflation, suggesting a process that is primarily demand driven.  
Some other studies (e.g. Bernanke 2002, Cargill and Parker 2004), however, claim that the 
change of inflation rate may primarily be driven by supply factors. For example, the strong 
productivity growth is thought to attribute to the era of persistent deflation. And another study 
conducted by Ha, Fan and Shu (2003) finds that world prices, the value of RMB and the level 
of productivity govern the long-run price movements in China.  
25 
————————————————————————————————————— 
 
Chapter 3 Inflation Dynamics in China 
 
A conclusion is arrived in the previous chapter that Chinese data do not fit into 
Svensson’s structure model. Given the fact that policy implications are model dependent, we 
don’t think the interest rate rule derived in Chapter 2 to be directly applicable in China. Some 
China specific factors have been discussed thereafter to provide possible explanation to this 
result. In this chapter, an alternative model based on Chand and Singh (2006) is introduced 
and tested. We’ll see why this model is considered an appropriate model for policy discussion 
in China.  
 
3.1 Chand and Singh (2006) Model 
In Chand and Singh (2006), a new inflation model combining demand and supply 
elements has been introduced. The model has several attributes. First of all, it gives an 
interpretation of the inflation generation process other than Svensson’s Phillips-curve-type 
postulation. Second, by introducing fiscal policy into the scene, it might be more suitable for 
policy analyses in countries where interest rate is not yet an effective policy instrument.  
 
The demand component of the model is presented as follows: 
1 1 1t t t tedπ π α ε+ + += + +         3.1 
1 1 1 1 1((1 )(1 ) 1) ( )t t t t t t ted y q y qπ π+ + + + +≡ − + + − − +     3.2 
1 1 2 1( )t t t t ty c Dd D iβ β π η+ += + − − +       3.3 
( 1 2, , 0α β β > , 1α ≤ ) 
tπ  is the inflation rate in period t; ty  is the growth rate of nominal income, with GDP 
current price as proxy; ted , short for excess demand, is a nominally valued variable defined 
by Equation 3.2; tqˆ  is the real potential output growth rate, which is assumed to be a function 
of technology, labor and capital inputs and exogenous in the current short-term context; 
td denotes the deficit ratio, the ratio of deficit to GDP; and ti still denotes the nominal interest 
rate. And as usual, D is the difference multiplier meaning first difference. All demand and 
supply shocks, ε,η in each period, are assumed to be i.i.d. The constant c corresponds to the 
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nominal growth rate in steady state, when inflation hits the target and real output grows at its 
potential.  
The introduction of ed, nominal excess demand, is the third feature worth mentioning 
about this model. What contributes to inflation here is not real output gap as in Svensson’s 
model, but this new variable ed. The definition of ed is given in Equation 3.2, where ty  
denotes the growth rate of current sales income and tqˆ denotes the potential growth rate of 
real output. Producers are assumed to have lagged expectations, expecting production cost to 
grow at previous period’s inflation rate. Therefore, t t+1ˆ((1+π )(1+q )-1)  is the expected growth 
of nominal sales income when the economy expands at its potential level. ed is then the 
growth of nominal aggregate demand that is in excess of this expectation, which is believed to 
lead to price adjustments. Equation 3.1 clearly conveys the nature of this inflation generating 
process. First, whenever excessive nominal demand deviates from zero, there will be 
inflationary (deflationary when ed is negative) pressure imposed on the economy; otherwise, 
inflation will remain at the previous level. Second, a non-zero ed will not be fully reflected in 
inflation ( 1α ≤ ). Third, steady state is achieved when the economy grows at its potential level 
and inflation rate constant, which corresponds to ed being zero.  
Equation 3.3 is a nominally valued aggregate demand function, which hypothesizes that 
the growth rate of nominal income is a positive function of the previous period’s growth in 
fiscal deficit and a negative function of the change in realized real interest rate. In Chand and 
Singh (2006), this hypothesis is directly introduced into the model and subsequently tested to 
be approved.  
 
From the above structure model, we can derive the following reduced form: 
t+1 t t t+1 1 t 2 t t t 1 t 1ˆ( +q -c)+ Dd D(i )π π α π αβ αβ π αη ε+ += − − − + +    3.4 
Now we solve the central bank’s decision problem again. The objective function is not 
changed, but the restriction, the law of motion of this system, has changed to the above 
reduced form. The central bank’s problem is:  
t t
-t
t
=t{Di ,Dd }
min  E L( )τ τ
τ
δ π∞∑   
s.t. t+1 t t t+1 1 t 2 t t t 1 t 1ˆ( +q -c)+ Dd D(i ) , tπ π α π αβ αβ π αη ε+ += − − − + + ∀  
where * 2t t
1L( ) ( )
2
π π π= −  
It is equivalent to the repetition of the following problems: 
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t t
* 2
t t+1 t t+1Di ,Dd
1min  E ) E ( )
2
L(δ π δ π π−=  
s.t. t+1 t t t+1 1 t 2 t t t 1 t 1ˆ( +q -c)+ Dd D(i )π π α π αβ αβ π αη ε+ += − − − + +  
Taking first order conditions with respect to policy instruments (control variables): 
*t t+1
2 t t+1
t
E L( ) (E ) 0
Di
δ π δαβ π π∂ = − − =∂       3.5 
*t t+1
1 t t+1
t
E L( ) (E ) 0
dD
δ π δαβ π π∂ = − =∂       3.6 
The optimal condition is therefore 
*
t t+1 t t t+1 1 t 2 t tˆE ( +q -c)+ Dd D(i )π π α π αβ αβ π π= − − − =     3.7 
In order to achieve optimality, policy instruments should be set so that the forecasted 
inflation rate equals the inflation target. 
Solving for instrument rules to get: 
*
t 1
t t t t t+1
2 2 2
1 ˆDi D + Dd ( +q -c)π π βπ παβ β β
−= + −      3.8 
*
t 2
t t t t t+1
1 1 1
1 ˆDd + D(i ) ( +q -c)π π β π παβ β β
−= − − +      3.9 
We now have two policy rules, one for interest rate and the other for deficit ratio. Rule 
3.8 is similar to Rule 2.11 in the sense that nominal interest rate should be increased whenever 
the current inflation exceeds the target. However, the setting of interest rate in Rule 3.8 also 
responds to fiscal deficit and the growth of nominal income in excess of its steady state level 
c. When fiscal deficit stimulates excess demand, interest rate should be raised accordingly to 
offset the influence cast on the rate of inflation. Rule 3.9 requires for a reduction in fiscal 
deficit when inflation rate exceeds the target, and fiscal and monetary policies are also 
required to counteract each other.  
According to the Mundell rule, we need to assign a single target to each instrument to 
ensure efficiency, and the target should be assigned to the instrument that has larger impact 
and less adverse side-effects on it. The one with relatively higher impact can be identified by 
comparing 1β  and 2β  in Equation 3.4. But as discussed in the previous chapter, given the 
importance of exchange rate stability in China at this moment, one can well argue that fiscal 
policy might stand out to be the proper choice among the two, due to its milder side effects.  
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3.2 Test of the Model Using Chinese Data 
3.2.1 Effect of the Introduction of ed 
We start with Equation 3.1, where we aim to check the effectiveness of the introduction 
of variable ed, or, the effectiveness of the alternative interpretation of inflation generation. 
The regression results are presented in Table 5 and the definitions of relevant variables are to 
be found in the Appendix. 
In Model B-1, variable ed is defined according to equation 3.2. It is clear that the 
introduction of ed has improved the explanatory power of the model. The normality test fails 
to reject the null-hypothesis of normality, therefore, the OLS estimators can be considered 
unbiased and the t-tests and F-test valid. We find that the coefficients of lagged inflation and 
ed are both positive and highly significant. The rolling regression plots of the two explanatory 
variables also support significance across the entire sample (see Figure 3-1). However, the 
fact that the coefficient of lagged inflation exceeds unity indicates the possible existence of an 
upward bias.  
Model B-2 defines another variable, EDNP, as the difference between nominal growth 
rate and real potential growth rate. This alteration has relaxed the assumption of inflation 
expectation formerly imposed on producers in the original Chand and Singh Model9. The 
                                                 
9 This model allows for heterogeneous composition in producers.  
Suppose a proportion Ηof the producers have static expectation, expecting the inflation rate to be the same as previous period, 
and the rest of producers have rational expectation.  
The definition of excess demand is actually: t+1 t+1 t+1 t+1 t+1 t+1 t+1ˆed y ((1 )(1 q ) 1) y ( q )
e eπ π≡ − + + − − +  
The expected inflation now is: t+1 t 1(1 )
e
tπ θπ θ π += + − , 0 1θ≤ ≤  
So, we have t+1 t+1 t 1 t+1 t+1 t 1 t+1ˆed y ((1 (1 ) )(1 q ) 1) y ( (1 ) q )t tθπ θ π θπ θ π+ +≡ − + + − + − − + − +  
And from Equation 3.1, we have 
t+1 t t+1 t 1
t t+1 t 1 t+1 t 1
t 1 t+1 t+1 t 1
ed
ˆ(y (1 ) -q )
ˆ(1 ) (1 ) (y -q )
t
t
π π α ε
π α θπ θ π ε
αθ π α θ π α ε
+
+ +
+ +
= + +
= + − − − +
= − − − + +
 
t+1 1 2 1 1 t t tEDNPπ λ π λ μ+ +⇒ = + +  
where 1
1
1 (1 )
αθλ α θ
−= + − , 2 1 (1 )
αλ α θ= + − , 
1
1 1 (1 )
t
t
εμ α θ
+
+ = + − , 1 t+1 t+1ˆ=y -qtEDNP+  
It is clear that 1 20 , 1λ λ≤ ≤ . And when 1θ = , it is reduced to the original specification. 
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regression result shows no significant improvement over Model B-1, implying the validity of 
the expectation assumption formerly imposed. The coefficient of EDNP is almost the same as 
the coefficient of ed in Model B-1. The coefficient of lagged inflation rate is reduced due to 
the change of variable from ed to EDNP. Rolling regression of coefficients can be found in 
Figure 3-2, suggesting significance over the entire sample. 
 
Table 5 Test of the Alternative Formulation 
  B-1 B-2 B-3 B-4 B-5 
 Pi Pi Pi Pi Pi 
  (1982-2003/04) (1982-2003/04) (1982-2003/04) (1982-2003/04) (1982-2003/04) 
Constant -0.004（0.008） -0.004（0.008） 0.003(0.013) -0.133(0.085) 0.026(0.095) 
Pi_1 1.249（0.111）* 0.421（0.091)* 0.909(0.128)* 0.516(0.177)** 0.581(0.153)* 
ED 0.761（0.099）*     
EDNP  0.752(0.099)*    
DGAP   1.776(0.521)*   
DLRYHP    1.807(0.914)*** -0.128(1.055) 
Dpi_1    0.409(0.294) 0.549(0.266)*** 
DI_lend_1    -1.695(2.057) 0.699(1.924) 
DDR_1    0.082(1.598) -0.283(1.335) 
DI_dep_1    0.963(1.921) -1.519(1.857) 
DLM2GAP_1     0.453(0.245)*** 
DLREER_1     -0.171(0.084)*** 
      
Sigma 0.0256 0.0258 0.0408 0.0451 0.0372 
RSS 0.0125 0.0126 0.0317 0.0306 0.0180 
R^2 0.869 0.8676 0.6674 0.6792 0.8112 
F(k-1,n-k) 63.02 [0.00]* 62.25 [0.00]* 19.06 [0.00]* 5.292 [0.00]** 6.982[0.00]** 
log-likelihood 51.0047 50.8876 40.7542 41.1513 46.9839 
DW 1.63 1.62 1.72 2.04 1.99 
n 22 22 22 22 22 
k 3 3 3 7 9 
mean(Pi) 0.0617 0.0617 0.0617 0.0617 0.0617 
var(Pi) 0.0043 0.0043 0.0043 0.0043 0.0043 
      
ForecastCHSQ 0.38428 [0.54] 0.35843 [0.55] 0.0613 [0.80] 0.0318[0.86] 0.0075[0.93] 
AR 1-2 test 1.4532 [0.26] 1.4859 [0.25] 0.9502 [0.41] 1.3733 [0.29]  6.9618[0.01]* 
ARCH 1-1 test 6.9904 [0.02]** 6.7450 [0.02]** 2.9633 [0.10] 0.2106 [0.65] 0.0547[0.82] 
Normality test 3.1884 [0.20] 3.4885 [0.17] 1.6064 [0.45] 5.1909 [0.07] 23.103[0.00]** 
hetero test  2.6315 [0.08]  1.3728 [0.29] 4.1697 [0.02]** 0.0927 [0.998] n.a. 
RESET test 1.5753 [0.23]  1.2736 [0.27] 0.2278 [0.64] 0.0950 [0.76]  0.0008[0.98] 
            
Note: Predictive failure tests are conducted by breaking the sample at 2004. * significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% 
level, *** significant at 10% level. Values in parenthesis () are standard errors and values in square brackets [ ] are p-values. 
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Figure 3-1  Rolling Regression of Model B-1 
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Figure 3-2 Rolling Regression of Model B-2 
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Model B-3 instead uses the parallel concept of first difference of output gap, DGAP 10.  
The estimated coefficients are still highly significant, but the R-square of the model has been 
significantly reduced. This is probably because of the unavoidable loss of information 
involved in the statistical reporting in real terms. Therefore, Model B-3 is not preferred to the 
other two and Model B-2 is our favorite among the three.  
 
3.2.2 The Demand Side 
Model B-1, B-2 and B-3 show that the interpretation of inflation being triggered by 
nominal excess demand has more explanatory power over the traditional Phillips curve 
interpretation. Now, we move on to the estimation of the reduced form equation 3.4, with 
exactly the same lag structure as specified. If the policy instruments are significant, we would 
be able to derive optimal policy rules accordingly. However, as presented in Model B-4, 
                                                 
10 The variable DGAP is a concept parallel to ed.  
We know that =t t tGAP LRY LRYHP−  and ln(1 )x x+  . 
Therefore, we have: 
1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
=
=( ) ( )
( ) ( )
ln ln
ln(1 ) ln(1 )
( )
t t t
t t t t
t t t t
t t
t t
t t t t
t t
t t t t
t t
t t
DGAP GAP GAP
LRY LRYHP LRY LRYHP
LRY LRY LRYHP LRYHP
RY RYHP
RY RYHP
RY RY RYHP RYHP
RY RYHP
RY RY RYHP RYHP y
RY RYHP
π
−
− −
− −
− −
− −
− −
− −
− −
−
− − −
= − − −
= −
− −= + − +
− −− = − − ˆtq
 
That is, DGAP can be interpreted as the gap between actual real output growth ( t ty π− ) and the potential real output 
growth ( tqˆ ). The former normally can be directly obtained from reported statistics, but there might be information loss 
involved due to statistical errors.  
It is easy to find that 1 1 1t t tEDNP DGAP π+ + += +  
Then Model B-2 can be written as t+1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1( )t t t t t t tEDNP DGAPπ λ π λ μ λ π λ π μ+ + + + += + + = + + +  
12
1 1
1 1
t
t t tDGAP
μλπ π λ λ
+
+ +⇒ = + +  
Note that in Table 5, the coefficient for DGAP in model B-3 exceeds unity, which corresponds to the fact that the 
coefficient 2λ  is larger than 1λ  in the regression of model B-2.  
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neither the lagged change of deposit rate nor the lagged change of deficit ratio turns out to 
have significant influence on current rate of inflation. To find out the determinants of nominal 
excess demand is therefore our next crucial step, since we need it to identify and quantify the 
scope for demand management.  
According to Keynesian tradition, there are four components of aggregate demand for an 
open economy. They are consumption, investment, government expenditure and net exports. 
For domestic demand, interest rates and money stock are conventionally recognized as 
monetary policy instruments, while fiscal deficit ratio is considered the proxy for fiscal policy. 
For external demand, we choose Nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) as an explanatory 
variable. NEER is the weighted average of major bilateral nominal exchange rates, with 
weights determined by trade shares reflecting different level of importance of each currency 
in a country’s international trade. It is a widely used index to assess competitiveness, 
reflecting the changes in trade flow induced by exchange rate. Real effective exchange rate 
(REER) is obtained by adjusting NEER for inflation differentials with those countries. Since 
the inflation rate in each country is assumed to broadly indicate the trends in domestic costs of 
production, REER is expected to reflect foreign competitiveness of domestic products. An 
appreciation, more foreign currency per unit of domestic currency, is considered unfavorable 
for exports. After several trials, we arrive at Model B-5 as presented in Table 5. It is clear that 
the inclusion of new variables has improved the explanatory power of the model. (R-square 
has increased to more than 0.8.) Several points need to pay attention to in this result. First, the 
growth rate of REER has a negative coefficient, the same as what we’ve expected. And it is 
significant at 10% level. Second, we’ve introduced variable DLM2GAP to capture the 
influence of excess money growth, separating the discretionary part from PBoC’s target of 
money growth. The coefficient is positive and significant in 10% level. Third, neither interest 
rates nor budget deficit appears to be significant. But given the knowledge of money supply 
generation, it could be that the inclusion of excess growth of money has reflected their 
influences already. Finally, note that deposit rate and lending rate have opposite signs. It is 
mystic on the first sight with conventional theories in mind which claim that both of them 
should have a negative sign obtained. Just think that higher deposit rate would pose liquidity 
constraint on the economy, negatively affecting expenditure, and that higher lending rate 
would discourage loan applications and reduce investment. However, it is possible in this case, 
since money growth is another explanatory variable included in the regression, which is held 
constant when measuring the influences of interest rates.  
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3.2.3 The Supply Side 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, several studies have identified supply side 
influences in the Chinese inflation dynamics. Therefore, the monetarist approach may not be 
broad enough to model the inflation movements. We now turn to the supply side, considering 
the possibility of cost pushed inflation and the influence of technological advances.  
It is assumed that the general price level in the economy is set as a markup on average 
marginal cost, which is the weighted average of marginal costs of all input factors. To present 
it mathematically, we have: 
1
i
n
t t it
i
P A X α
=
= ∏ ,where
1
1
n
i
i
α
=
=∑     
The environment of this model economy is simple, with only one firm producing one 
goods from n different input factors. The price level in period t is Pt. And the ith factor 
involved in the production process accounts for a share of iα  in the total cost, with Xi as its 
cost. At is the markup for time t, and is assumed to be constant over time. However, we need 
to keep in mind that it might vary due to environment changes such as productivity 
improvements or price competition.  
Taking logs, we get:    
n
t t i it
i=1
lnP = lnA + a lnX∑  
Then take first difference to get:    
n
i i
i=1
Pi = a+ a x∑  
The rate of inflation can be interpreted as a weighted average of the cost inflation of 
different input factors, and is also influenced by the growth rate of profit margin, a . However, 
within an economy-wide context, it is always very hard for us to obtain information as 
tailored as we need. Improvements in statistics do help, for example, the Corporate Goods 
Price Index (CGPI) published by PBoC in recent years might be a better choice for our study 
compared with CPI, but we need to stick to CPI inflation here due to the absence of CGPI in 
early years of our sample11. To capture the influences from costs, we need to search for some 
key variables, which are both sensitive and important in the production process. An 
                                                 
11 CGPI has been published monthly buy PBoC since 1996, with easy access from PBoC website for data after 1999. CGPI 
used to be called Wholesale Price Index (WPI), indicating the general price level right after production. CPI is different in the 
sense that it is the price level faced by consumers. Considering the possibility that retailers might not be willing to increase 
prices due to competition in the retail industry, (which is highly possible and definitely applicable in China where retailers 
care very much about their market share), CGPI is a more proper choice when analyzing cost pushed inflation. However, due 
to un-accessibility of sufficiently long series of annual CGPI, we have no other choice but to use CPI inflation in our analysis.  
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exploration of the available monthly CGPI data can surely shed some light on it (see Figure 
3-3). The overall index of CGPI is published together with price indices of its key 
components, including Agricultural Product Price Index (APPI), Mining Product Price Index 
(MPPI), Coal, Oil & Electricity Price Index (COEPI) and Processed Products Price Index 
(PPPI). We can see that PPPI has the least fluctuations around the overall index, while energy 
price COEPI and food price APPI appear to be highly volatile. These observations can serve 
as guidelines in choosing proxy for our analysis.  
 
Figure 3-3 CGPI (Corporate Goods Price Index) and Its Components (1999.01 - 2006.02) 
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PPPI (Processed Products Price Index) 
 
Note: The original data are reported as index with respect to the corresponding month of the previous year. 
Therefore, the original data are transformed to moving average of previous 12 months to assure comparability 
across the sample. (source: PBoC)  
 
 
Regression result for the supply side is presented as Model C-1 in Table 6. Growth rate of 
nominal wage (DLNW) is defined as the first difference of the logged nominal wage index of 
an average employer. It captures the general increase in labor costs. Growth rate of fertilizer 
price (DLFP) is employed to represent the cost increase in agriculture. And the world oil 
prices (DLWOP) is introduced to reflect the rising cost of energy. Several specifications are 
tested, but none of them have DLNW and the first lag of NLWOP significant. The only 
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significant variable is DLFP. This can be explained by the following three facts. First, the 
Chinese government has tight control over domestic energy prices and the domestic energy 
price is not synchronized with the world out there.  A base price is set by the Reform and 
Development Committee, which is then constantly adjusted to incorporate fluctuations of 
world oil prices, but there are always other domestic considerations embedded in the 
adjustments. DLWOP therefore has no significant influence on domestic CPI inflation. 
Second, CPI inflation is not sensitive to labor costs either. It echoes with the discovery of 
labor-cost insignificance in India (Chand and Singh, 2006). A phenomenon like this could be 
caused either by the lack of adjustments in wage itself, or by the reluctance of retailers to 
increase prices. To put it another way, one reason for this is that the labor cost itself hasn’t 
changed much across the sample, arguably due to the seemingly infinite supply of labor. 
Another possible reason is that even if manufacturing companies did pay out more money to 
cover their labor cost, the price faced by final consumers were not increased. It can be 
explained by the importance of market share and the growth in productivity. On one hand, 
because of the huge market potentially available, even a moderate market share can be 
translated into a large volume, and even a small margin can make a profitable business. If 
increasing price undermines market share, they’d rather shrink the markup and play it safe. 
On the other hand, TFP has been rising at an average rate of 2-3% per year, way faster than 
the 1% of East Asian tigers at the same stage of their development during 1960-1984. 
Technological improvements make it possible to produce more goods with one unit of labor, 
which cancels out the effect of wage increase on the price of final goods. Third, DLFP is 
highly significant, reflecting the government’s attitude towards agriculture. Because of the 
necessity of agriculture production and the still-high proportion of rural residents, food prices 
are sensitive to agricultural costs, in order to maintain sufficient profit margin to keep the 
farmers’ lives sustainable.  
Model C-2 is a regression combining the supply- and demand- side variables. When 
considered together with demand side factors, even the only significant supply-side variable 
becomes insignificant. A test of excluding the three supply side variables is then carried out to 
improve the model. The result supports exclusion.  
We finally arrive at Model C-3. Current domestic inflation can be explained by previous 
inflation and contemporaneous nominal excess demand. Lagged trade condition REER is also 
included in the model to take into account external demand. The R-square is pretty high, 
indicating a strong explanatory power of the model. Based on the above result, the inflation 
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dynamics of China is largely a demand-driven process. However, we need to keep in mind 
that the insignificance of supply side variable might also be caused by poor proxy. And even 
if it is true that supply-side factors don’t count much in the historical movement of inflation, it 
does not necessarily mean insignificant influence in the future. Therefore, adopting this 
alternative approach is a better way to understand the nature of inflation than the previous 
monetarist way, where demand-driven inflation is taken for granted.  
Model C-3 gives us support on the potential possibility of inflation management through 
aggregate demand channel. However, we’ve learned from Model B-4 that both interest rates 
and fiscal deficit have insignificant influence on the rate of inflation. Another regression has 
actually been carried out, with nominal excess demand as the dependent variable. But none of 
them are found significant either. Then, what is the source of nominal excess demand? What 
is the proper way to formulate demand influences? These are issues following up in the next 
chapter. 
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Table 6 Regression Results with Supply Side Variables Included 
  C-1 C-2 C-3 
 Pi Pi Pi 
  (1983-2003/04) (1983-2003/04) (1983-2003/04) 
Constant 0.004(0.023) -0.022(0.018) -0.008(0.007) 
Pi_1  0.467(0.118)* 0.490(0.083)* 
EDNP  0.373(0.064)*** 0.632(0.097)* 
DLNW 0.261(0.184) 0.172(0.156)  
DLFP 0.473(0.111)* 0.085(0.115)  
DLWOP_1 0.004(0.035) 0.024(0.026)  
DLREER_1  -0.174(0.064)** -0.130(0.049)** 
    
Sigma 0.0372 0.0234 0.0225 
RSS 0.0235 0.0077 0.0091 
R^2 0.7479 0.9180 0.9046 
F(k-1,n-k) 16.81[0.000]* 26.13[0.000]** 56.92[0.000}** 
log-likelihood 41.5398 53.3338 54.4972 
DW 1.55 1.64 1.62 
N 21 21 22 
K 4 7 4 
Mean(Pi) 0.0637932 0.0637932 0.061749 
var(Pi) 0.0044446 0.0044446 0.0043303 
    
ForecastCHSQ 2.3823[0.1227] 0.65422[0.4186] 0.26267[0.6083] 
AR 1-2 test 0.96668[0.4028] 2.2271[0.1505] 2.8358[0.0883] 
ARCH 1-1 test 0.51378[0.4845] 5.7788[0.0333]* 12.503[0.0027]** 
Normality test 0.33232[0.8469] 0.65117[0.7221] 0.18761[0.9105] 
Hetero test 0.31243[0.9162] 0.0980[0.9923] 0.82846[0.5716] 
RESET test 0.29132[0.5968] 10.332[0.0068]** 8.6890[.0090]** 
    
Note:  Predictive failure tests are conducted by breaking the sample at 2004. *significant at 1% level, **significant at 
5% level, *** significant at 10% level. Values in parenthesis () are standard errors and values in square brackets [ ] 
are p-values.  
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Chapter 4  Inflation Management in China 
 
The finding of our empirical analyses up till now conveys two key points:  
First, Svensson’s structural model doesn’t fit the data well. This could probably be 
caused by misspecification of demand-side influences as they apply in China or the neglect of 
supply side factors in the inflation generating process. By testing the alternative Chand & 
Singh model, which takes both sides into account, we find that cost inflation really hasn’t 
played a significant role in the Chinese inflation dynamics. The ineffectiveness of Svensson’s 
model may be caused by improper formulation of demand-side influences.  
Second, the result indicates significant influence from the external sector captured by the 
growth of Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER). Given the significance of nominal excess 
demand in the inflation dynamics, there is scope for demand management policy in inflation 
control in China, and thus a potential possibility of adopting inflation targeting framework. 
However, neither fiscal deficit nor interest rates appear to be significant determinants of 
nominal excess demand. Instead, excess growth of M2 (DLM2GAP) is found significantly 
correlated with current rate of inflation, lagging for one period.  
What is the reason behind the insignificance of those policy instruments? What is the 
source of nominal excess demand in China? When can the applicability of Inflation Targeting 
Framework change from potential to reality? And what’s the way ahead for China to manage 
its inflation and assure a favorable environment for its sustainable growth? These are the 
problems to be addressed in this chapter.  
 
4.1 Behind the Ineffective Interest Rates 
The ineffectiveness of interest rates in China is largely due to the badly functioning 
banking system, which disconnects the transmission mechanism that is commonly exhibited 
in the well-developed economies. In China, credit is allocated with relatively less regards to 
its price and a relatively higher degree of government meddling. Besides, home mortgage and 
consumer loan are still in their infancy. Therefore, the deregulation of interest rates and the 
reform of banking sector are crucial to China’s future development. China cannot afford an 
abrupt change towards floating exchange rate without first clearing up the banking sector. 
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There’s still a long way to go before the right time comes for China to build up a standard 
inflation targeting framework.  
 
4.1.1 Financial System in China: Past and Present 
 
Pre-1979 
The chief tasks of any financial system are to attract savings and channel them to 
productive investments as efficiently as possible. However, there was no such concept of 
banking in the highly centralized pre-reform Chinese economy. Banks were merely planning 
machines that took whatever the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) had earned and reallocated 
them through budgetary grants. The allocation decisions were made in accordance to SOEs’ 
self-reported production plans, which were inefficiently upward-biased due to SOEs’ desire 
for more funding. A strong government made all the decisions, which left the individuals 
incompetent to pursue their own benefits and bankers too ignorant to understand the true 
meaning of banking. The opening-up policy of 1978 is a cutting point in the history of 
China’s development, when China launched the plan to abandon central planning. However, it 
is not an easy job to cultivate a market-oriented culture out of the deep-rooted central-
planning customs. The banking system in China is still relatively weak, even among the 
developing countries alike. 
 
1979-1994  
The monopolistic position held by PBoC was removed in 1979, arguably the first move 
in China’s banking reform. Three specialized banks were established to take over PBoC’s 
banking business. They are Agriculture Bank of China (ABC) for rural banking, Bank of 
China (BOC) for foreign currency transactions, and China Construction Bank (CCB) for the 
construction sector. A fourth specialized bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
(ICBC), was established in 1984, taking over all the urban commercial banking activities 
from PBoC in 1994, when PBoC finally get on board for the central bank’s role. Several other 
banks were also established during the 1980s, including the state-owned China Investment 
Bank (1981), the joint-stock Bank of Communications (1986), and CITIC Industrial Bank 
(1987) owned by China Investment and Trust Corporation.  
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It was mainly a period for institutional buildup, at the end of which a two-tiered banking 
system was established, with People’s Bank of China (PBoC) transformed to a central bank 
and four specialized banks taking charge of different areas in the economy. 
 
1994-present  
Financial reforms have been carried out continuously since the 1990s. According to a 
report from Asian Development Bank (Shirai and Rajasekaran, 2001), the major financial 
reforms from 1994 were centered on separating commercial lending and policy lending,  
transforming the four specialized banks and the urban credit cooperatives into commercial 
banks and establishing three policy-lending banks and new commercial banks. Other reforms 
were the removal of credit plans, reduced government intervention in credit allocation, 
(limited) entry deregulation, a narrowing of the scope of business, (limited) interest rate 
deregulation, tightened accounting and prudential norms, and financial sector restructuring. 
But the current financial system is still highly underdeveloped in the sense that it is still 
dominated by banks, and the debt and equity markets are among the smallest in the world.  
 
4.1.2 Interest Rates in China 
As for interest rate deregulations, banks were allowed to adjust lending rates within a 
certain margin below and above the administered rate in the late 1980s, while such flexibility 
on deposit rates was not granted. Later on, in 1989, an austerity program was carried out 
reversing this liberalization process until the early 1990s. When the program ended, banks 
were allowed to set interest rates again, still with ceilings and floors around the administered 
rate, but the margin was gradually expanded. In 2004, the ceiling on lending rates for banks 
and the floor on deposit rates were finally removed, opening up for more lending to private 
businesses, particularly smaller ones. The floor on lending rates is said to be gradually 
removed, starting from 2006, while the ceiling on deposit rates will remain until 2008 to 2010. 
The rationale is that this delay will prevent bank margins from declining too rapidly when 
foreign competitors enter the market at the end of 2006, as was scheduled by China’s entry 
commitment to WTO.  
However, Chinese banks lack credit risk assessment skills required for effective lending. 
They are risk-averse in nature and feel more secure lending to SOEs or government-related 
projects, which is a typical symptom of central planning syndrome. The fact that commercial 
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banks in small rural areas always belong to local government even adds to the problem. First, 
the lack of standard risk-assessment procedure makes them vulnerable to political influences 
from local government officials. Second, local governments tend to direct capital to SOEs 
even if they are less productive. They do so in the fear of social disturbances possibly resulted 
from large scale SOE layoffs. And local construction projects can always get cheap finance, 
which contributes to the apparent overheating investment boom in China. Therefore, despite 
the general trend towards deregulation, SOEs and government-related projects still appear to 
get the majority of lending from banks and add to the already problematic nonperforming 
loans. Small private business and entrepreneurs, on the other hand, have to turn to informal 
banking sector and pay for a higher rate.  
The inefficient allocation of capital and the declining capital return lead to low deposit 
rates. But thanks to the traditionally acclaimed habit of savings, banks continue to enjoy a 
low-cost source of money from depositors. The Chinese people, having a natural urge to save 
no matter what, still have their savings account for almost 40% of GDP and are relatively less 
sensitive to changes in deposit rates due to lack of alternatives for their portfolios, i.e. the lack 
of healthy equity and corporate-bond markets and the lack of other options such as insurance 
and mutual funds. And there is a fraction of population illiterate in economic sense who even 
won’t aware of the fact that they are losing money when interest rates falls below the rate of 
inflation. Therefore, banks in China generally face little competition in attracting savings.  
 
4.1.3 The Financial System in China: Future 
The banking sector in China has till now been quite successful with the task of attracting 
savings - though largely due to reasons other than their own merits – but relatively less 
efficient in the allocation of these capital. With the foreseeable competition coming from 
foreign competitors, the current situation is expected to change. 
At this moment, foreign banks have relatively few branches in China and the areas of 
business allowed are still limited to foreign currency denominated financial services. 
However, foreign banks will be allowed to enter domestic currency market in December 2006. 
Although it will take considerable time for them to grow organically, their impact on 
domestic commercial banks will be immense. First, the flow of deposits currently safely 
coming in will be disturbed by alternative options bearing higher return. Second, the lack-of 
risk-assessment-skill problem will become a vital flaw of domestic financial intermediaries, 
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gradually depriving them of the market share and the customer loyalty they are now enjoying. 
However, the bright side is even more attractive in the long run. The efficiency of the banking 
sector as a whole is bound to improve. And the interest rate deregulation will be expected to 
take a big step forward. If the lending rate is liberalized in conjunction with the reform of 
corporate-bond market, interest rates will become effective candidates for monetary policy 
instruments. Given the significantly demand-driven nature of the Chinese inflation generating 
process, it is possible to adopt Inflation Targeting Framework when effective policy 
instruments become available.  
 
4.2 Exchange Rate Regime and Monetary Autonomy 
Since the exchange rate in China has remained fixed during most of the sample period, 
the analyses in previous chapters are mainly based on closed economy model, and an 
effective exchange rate variable was introduced to control for influences on the inflation rate 
from the external sector.  
However, the flexibility of exchange rate is an important prerequisite for the formulation 
of optimal monetary policy under ITF, without which there is actually no monetary autonomy. 
When pegged to US dollar and facing a strong RMB appreciation pressure, central bank had 
to frequently and passively absorb excess supply of US dollar to clear the market and 
maintain the peg, leaving a variety of problems in the enforcement of monetary policy.  
After the July 21 Reform of 2005, when RMB appreciated 2.1% against US dollar and 
replace the dollar-peg by a reference basket consisting of several major currencies, it is still 
the case since the country is still trying hard to maintain exchange rate stability. Whenever 
there is excess supply of foreign currency on the foreign exchange market, PBoC will have to 
sell yuan in order to keep the exchange rate stable. This means injection of new liquidity into 
the banking system. Theoretically speaking, it is possible for PBoC to issue bonds and mop 
up the liquidity, a strategy commonly known as sterilization. But as the amount accumulates, 
sterilization is getting harder and harder, especially facing the huge build-up of foreign 
reserves. When the bank fails to sell enough bonds, money supply will surge and give rise to 
demand-driven inflation. It is widely accepted that the RMB is undervalued, and the 2005 
appreciation even lured in more hot money. The speculative capital inflows expose the 
country to huge exchange rate risks. Therefore, it would be unwise for China to float the 
exchange rate at this stage. We can expect a gradual approach for this reform.  
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4.3 Policy Implications for China 
It is clear that in the long run, Inflation Targeting Framework would be an appropriate 
choice for China’s monetary policy formulation given the demand-driven nature of inflation 
generating process. However, ITF is not a proper choice in the short run. With the not yet 
deregulated exchange rate regime, the not yet freed capital account, and the persistent 
weakness of the financial sector, adopting ITF immediately can be a highly destabilizing 
choice. Recall the discussed in Chapter 3 that assigning interest rates to the objective induces 
large side effects, we might consider fiscal policy as an alternative. A strategy is proposed in 
Chand & Singh (2006) for India to use interest rates as an exchange rate stabilizing tool, 
while relying more on fiscal discipline for inflation stabilization. Given the similarity between 
the two countries, we may expect the same result for China.  
Actually, China started using proactive fiscal instruments in 1998, when monetary policy 
failed to stimulate the economy during the persistent deflationary period after the 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis. Fiscal deficit has increased dramatically in the past few years, spending on 
infrastructures and construction projects, improving ‘hardware’ of economic development and 
contributing to the continued growth of Chinese economy. It is argued that fiscal policy has 
contributed a lot to the appearance of overheating. Concerned with the problem, the central 
government has recently announced an appeal for prudent fiscal policy. Just as an official 
presented, “the central government wants to send a message of the direction of macro-control 
to the public through its fiscal policy, that is, to prevent more symptoms of inflation and the 
emergence of deflation, by cutting down the deficit in the central budget.”  
But to rely on fiscal instruments is at best a temporary strategy. Several reforms should 
be carried out during this temporarily fiscal-dominated period to prepared for future adoption 
of the inflation targeting framework: 
 First, the reason why interest rate cuts failed to stimulate the economy during deflation is 
not only the love of savings. When considering basic human needs, we’ll have a deeper 
understanding of the problem. The urge to save is basically coming from the pursuit of 
security. Therefore, if an effective social security system isn’t in place and employment isn’t 
secured with the presence of surplus labor, it is natural for households to save. Therefore, 
social security reform should be launched to clear up this channel, and it should be ranked 
high on our agenda.  
Second, with the competition from foreign banks that will enter RMB denominated 
business after 2006, the efficiency of the banking system would be increased. In the previous 
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arrangement, when domestic commercial banks are highly protected, it is very difficult for 
private business and small entrepreneurs to get credit from the banking system. They have to 
turn to informal banking sector for funds, which always ends up with higher costs. At the 
same time, less competent SOEs and government related projects continued to enjoy cheap 
finance. However, in a more competitive environment, domestic banks need to make more 
accountable lending decisions with the help of credit-rating organizations and risk 
management skills. Given its importance, to build up a credit rating system is also crucial for 
an effective policy framework in the future. 
And finally, since optimal policy is model dependent, it is also a necessary preparation 
for Chinese monetary authority to master the skill of economic modeling and for statistical 
agencies to improve the quality of data. When ITF is finally implemented, these factors will 
be crucial for the credibility of monetary policy and greatly influence the effectiveness of this 
type of inflation management.  
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Appendix 
* Variable names and acronyms are listed in alphabetic order. 
* The general denotation rule for variable X:  
X_n:  variable X lagged for n periods 
DX:  DX=X-X_1 
LX:  LX=ln(X) 
DLX:  DLX=LX-LX_1=ln(X/X_1)≈(X-X_1)/X_1 (approximately the growth rate)  
 
APPI  Agriculture Product Price Index 
CGPI   Corporate Goods Price Index  
COEPI   Coal, Oil & Electricity Price Index 
CPI   Consumer Price Index 
DR   Deficit Ratio, DR=Deficit/GDP 
ED   Nominal Excess Demand (Definition see page 28) 
EDNP   Nominal Excess Demand Net Potential Real Growth (Definition see page 28) 
Fis   Fiscal Policy Instrument (Deficit Ratio as proxy) 
FP   Factor Price Index 
GAP  GAP=LRY-LRYHP 
I_dep   Annual Deposit Rate 
I_lend   Annual Lending Rate 
LM2GAP  Excess Money Growth 
LRY  LRY=log(RY) 
LRYHP LRYHP=smooth_hp(LRY, 6.25, LRYHP) 
M1  Currency in circulation 
M2  M2=M1+Savings 
MPPI  Mining Product Price Index 
NEER  Nominal Effective Exchange Rate 
NW  Nominal Wage for an Average Employee 
NY   Nominal Gross Domestic Product (current price) 
Pi  Rate of Inflation  
PPPI  Processed Products Price Index 
REER  Real Effective Exchange Rate 
RPI  Retail Price Index 
RW  Real Wage  
RY  Real Gross Domestic Product Index (1977=100) 
WOP  World Oil Price 
 
